In 1993 it was reported that USA forces had greatly over-estimated the amount of Iraqi army equipment destroyed during the air phase of the war of the Gulf War: of the 846 tanks, 146 were actually destroyed compared to 388 estimated; the number of Iraqi naval vessels reported destroyed was three times the size of the Iraqi navy; the number of Scud launchers claimed destroyed was four times greater than the total launchers deployed. This was considered the greatest failure of the intelligence community during Operation Desert Storm. The methodologies used led to major disagreements between the intelligence gathering and evaluation teams. The same report found that military intelligence was totally unaware of more than half of Iraq's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon.
In 1993 Russia indicated that its nuclear arsenal had peaked seven years previously at 45,000 warheads, namely 12,000 more than generally believed, and exceeding all estimates save those of the most radical analysts.