Active non-alignment

Active non-alignment (ANA) is a foreign policy doctrine that serves as a guide to action for small countries in a world undergoing changes. The grand strategy is “playing the field”, by which is meant picking and choosing among the various issues on the country’s international agenda and test which one of the Great Powers will provide a better deal. 

As mentioned above, ANA is a means to an end, a tool to allow developing nations to preserve their autonomy and independence and not be subjected to the whims of the Great Powers. It should not be confused with neutrality, a term derived from international law which refers to the position taken by third parties vis a vis a particular armed conflict, and that connotes a certain degree of passivity.  Nor does it equal diplomatic equidistance, a term that conveys a somewhat mechanical middle position between two Great Powers. In ANA, it is perfectly possible to be closer to one of the Great Powers on certain issues, and to another on a totally different set of issues.

That said, ANA’s application demands a highly sophisticated diplomacy, with analytical capabilities that can evaluate each issue on its merits and draw the necessary conclusions. It is a policy in which managing timing and sequencing is critical. To take sides and align yourself with one of the Great Powers is easy: you simply do as you are told. But it also means you lose all leverage. ANA, on the other hand, requires a pro-active attitude, looking out for opportunities in the international scenario, and exploit them to the fullest. It can thus be much more rewarding.

For weaker states, the main concern is development, that is, how to grow their economy, create jobs and raise the standard of living of their population. This is very different from the priorities of the Great Powers, whose main concern is security and their defense preparedness vis a vis rival powers. At the same time, in a situation of a declining hegemon threatened by the rise of another power, there is a natural competition for the “hearts and minds” of the peoples and governments in the rest of the world. The hegemon needs to prove that it is still on top of the heap. The rising power, on the other hand, needs to show that it is up and coming in the international hierarchy.

ANA takes a page from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of yesteryear but adapts it to the realities of the new century. The latter include the rise of the Asian giants (China and India) and the replacement of the diplomatie des cahiers de doleances (“victimhood diplomacy”, best expressed in the demands for a massive North-South transfer of resources embodied in the New International Economic Order, NIEO, articulated by the NAM in the seventies and eighties) of the old Third World by  “collective financial statecraft”. 

The very notion of Active Non-Alignment arose in Latin America in 2019-2020 as the region was hit by a triple whammy: the Covid-19 pandemic; the biggest economic downturn in 120 years; and US pressures to cancel China-related projects. ANA emerged as a response to the need to manage the challenges associated with such a deep-seated crisis. It resonated widely in the region.

The 21st Century's international development institutions, like the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (the so-called “BRICS Bank”) and the Latin American Development Bank (the old CAF).  It is a world in which South-South trade represents over 50 per cent of global trade (as opposed to a mere 20 per cent in the seventies) and in which FDI and financial cooperation no longer originate solely or even mainly in the developed North.  In this context, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, the current competition between the United States and China offers significant opportunities to developing nations. Yes, there are some similarities between today and the days of the Cold War and its bipolar world dominated by the US-USSR conflict. Still, there is a key difference. The Soviet economy was a closed economy, and much smaller than that of the United States. It thus had little to offer to what was then known as the Third World in terms of trade, FDI or financial cooperation. China’s situation, with a much larger and more open economy and policy banks like the China Development Bank and the Eximbank that can provide significant amounts of financial cooperation (as evidenced by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, that spent one trillion dollars in infrastructure projects in its first decade of existence, from 2013-2023, mostly in the Global South) is very different.